STARM · HW-09 · HARDWARE

Trojan Logic in FPGA

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STARMCatalog entries from the DIPS Threat Inventory. The paper cites that dataset and does not use this name.

Malicious code embedded in FPGA bitstream.

Severity in the dataset9/10

Not the paper’s H/M/L.

Target
System Logic
Layer in the inventory
FPGA / Logic gates
Mitigation
Bitstream encryption and authentication.
How the inventory says to fix it
AI: Structural analysis of bitstream logic to identify hidden trigger-activation patterns.
Quick fix
Reload bitstream
ML approaches named
Random Forest (RF), XGBoost, Logistic Regression, and Support Vector Machines (SVM), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
Methodology
Detetcing malicious modifications to bitstreams or Register Transfer Level (RTL) code. Pattern detection and side-channel analysis
Handler role
FPGA Developer
Stage
Development
Standard named
IEEE 1735
Status in the inventory
Status unknown

STARMCatalog entries from the DIPS Threat Inventory. The paper cites that dataset and does not use this name.

Connection recorded in the inventory

Hardware Backdoors